Recombinant DNA technology will soon allow physicians an opportunity to carry out both somatic cell- and Germ-Line gene therapy. While somatic cell gene therapy raises no new ethical problems, gene therapy of gametes, fertilized eggs or early embryos does raise several novel concerns. The first issue discussed here relates to making a distinction between negative and positive eugenics; the second issue deals with the evolutionary consequences of lost genetic diversity. In distinguishing between positive and negative eugenics, the concept of malady (...) is applied as a definitional criterion for identifying genetic disorders that could qualify for Germ-Line therapy. Because gene replacement techniques are currently unavailable for humans, and because even if they were possible the number of people involved would be quite small, the loss of diversity concern seems moot. Finally, we dissuss the issue of iatrogenic disorders associated with gene therapy and discuss several ‘real world considerations.’. (shrink)

Background In Canadian jurisdictions without specific legislation pertaining to research consent, the onus is placed on researchers to determine whether a child is capable of independently consenting to participate in a research study. Little, however, is known about how child health researchers are approaching consent and capacity assessment in practice. The aim of this study was to explore and describe researchers' current practices. Methods The study used a qualitative descriptive design consisting of 14 face-to-face interviews with child health researchers and (...) research assistants in Southern Ontario. Transcribed interviews were analysed for common themes. Results Procedures for assessing capacity varied considerably from the use of age cutoffs to in-depth engagement with each child. Three key issues emerged from the accounts: (1) requirements that consent be provided by a single person thwarted researchers' abilities to support family decision-making; (2) little practical distinction was made between assessing if a child was capable, versus determining if study information had been adequately explained by the researcher; and (3) participants' perceived that review boards' requirements may conflict with what they considered ethical consent practices. Conclusion The results suggest that researchers' consent and capacity knowledge and skills vary considerably. Perceived discrepancies between ethical practice and ethics boards' requirements suggest the need for dialogue, education and possibly ethics board reforms. Furthermore we propose, where appropriate, a ‘family decision-making’ model that allows parents and their children to consent together, thereby shifting the focus from separate assent and consent procedures to approaches that appropriately engage the child and family. (shrink)

Even after multiple cycles of ABET accreditation, many engineering programs are unsure of how much curriculum content is needed to meet the requirements of ABET’s Criterion 3.f (an understanding of professional and ethical responsibility). This study represents the first scholarly attempt to assess the impact of curriculum reform following the introduction of ABET Criterion 3.f. This study sought to determine how much professional and ethical responsibility curriculum content was used between 1995 and 2005, as well as how, when, why, and (...) to what effect changes in the amount of content occurred. Subsequently, the study sought to evaluate if different amounts of curriculum content generated differing student outcomes. The amount of curriculum content used by each of the participating programs was identified during semi-structured interviews with program administrators and a review of ABET Self-Study documents. Quantitative methods were applied to determine if a relationship existed between the curriculum content and performance on a nationally administered, engineering-specific standardized examination. The findings indicate a statistical relationship, but a lack of structure between the amount of required content in the curriculum and performance on the examination. Additional findings were also generated regarding the way that programs interpret the Criterion 3.f feedback generated during accreditation visits. The primary impact of this study is that it dispels the myth that more courses or course time on professionalism and ethics will necessarily lead to positive engineering education outcomes. Much of the impetus to add more curriculum content results from a lack of conclusive feedback during ABET accreditation visits. (shrink)

Machine learning algorithms may radically improve our ability to diagnose and treat disease. For moral, legal, and scientific reasons, it is essential that doctors and patients be able to understand and explain the predictions of these models. Scalable, customisable, and ethical solutions can be achieved by working together with relevant stakeholders, including patients, data scientists, and policy makers.

All of our information about the world is derived from the function of our senses, and thus they are the principal source of all our knowledge. This was recognized explicitly by early Greek philosophers, remained an important point of discussion for nineteenth‐century philosophers, and continues to be a key issue for present‐day philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists. It is a key issue in cognitive science because, by initiating the processes that store and evaluate information, sensory information transmission can be considered a (...) cognitive initiator. In a very real sense, who we are and how we see the world are the result of the experiences that are mediated by our sensory systems. These are some of the reasons why the study of sensory systems has occupied such a prominent place in modern cognitive neuroscience. (shrink)

Burgess, J.P. and Rosen, G. Subject with No ObjectElliott, R.Faking Nature.

In 2035 global egg demand will have risen 50% from 1985. Because we are not able to tell in the egg whether it will become a male or female chick, billons of one day-old male chicks will be killed. International research initiatives are underway in this area, and governments encourage the development of an alternative with the goal of eliminating the culling of day-old male chicks. The Netherlands holds an exceptional position in the European egg trade, but is also the (...) only country in the European Union where the downside of the egg sector, the practice of killing day-old male chicks, is a recurrent subject of societal debate. ‘Preventing the killing of young animals’ and ‘in ovo sex determination’ are the two alternative approaches available to solve this problem. It is clear that both approaches solve the problem of killing day-old male chicks, either by keeping them alive or by preventing them from living, but they also raise a lot of new animal welfare-related dilemmas. A thorough analysis was undertaken of these dilemmas and the results are presented in this article. The analysis resulted in an ethical framework based on the two main approaches in bioethics: a consequentialist approach and a deontological approach. This ethical framework was used to develop an online survey administered to ascertain Dutch public opinion about these alternative approaches. The results show that neither alternative will be fully accepted, or accepted by more than half of Dutch society. However, the survey does provide an insight into the motives that are important for people’s choice: food safety and a good treatment of animals. Irrespective of the approach chosen, these values should be safeguarded and communicated clearly. (shrink)

William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers? Ethics Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998, viii + 253 pp.

Lloyd Weinreb, Oedipus at Fenway Park: What Rights There Are and Why There Are Any Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994, viii, 221 pp.

Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm Of Rights Harvard University Press, 1990, viii, 383pp.

Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality New York: Oxford University Press, 1987; xii, 383pp.

I argue that, If one adopts a minimal naturalism (of a kind rejected by moore, Hare, "et al".), One would adopt a methodology which yields conclusions identical to that yielded by intuitionistic methodology (of a kind employed by ross, Prichard, "et al".). I dilate upon the advantages which thus accrue to each theory, And I defend my minimal naturalism against a variety of objections.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Prima Facie Duty to Obey: A Brief History Implications of Catechistic Metaethics for the Duty of Obedience Implications of Commonalist Metaethics for the Duty of Obedience Conclusion References.

Intuitionism has for many years been a poor relation among the various metaethical theories, commonly thought both parochial and irrational. Most recent writers who attempt a survey of ethical theory mention it briefly in an embarrassed sort of way, and then dismiss it in a paragraph or two. John Rawls, however, does not share this common attitude. In his recent book he represents his own theory as being an alternative both to intuitionism and to utilitarianism, and it is apparent from (...) his discussion that he takes both of these latter theories seriously, as having substantial attraction to reasonable men. Those sympathetic to intuitionism have no doubt been cheered by Rawls’ respectful treatment; but they are likely also to have been dismayed by the fact that, because he focuses upon a somewhat unusual understanding of it, he does not make clear how his theory stands in relation to intuitionism in its most general form, nor whether there are varieties of intuitionism consistent with the whole of his theory or at least with important parts of it. I shall try to answer these questions here. (shrink)

In "moral arguments" ("mind", 1958), Philippa foot displayed what she claimed to be a deduction of an evaluative conclusion from a non-Evaluative premise. In "freedom and reason", R m hare attacks foot-Style deductions on two grounds: he first offers a "reductio", Comparing them to a racist deduction; he then offers an explanation of where all of these arguments go awry. I argue in my paper's first part that hare's explanation rests upon a defective criterion of entailment. In passing I show (...) how this counts against certain noncognitivist arguments that purport to show that moral judgments cannot be factual. In the second part I show that foot-Style deductions--And the racist deduction as well--Are either unsound or else superfluous to the naturalist's enterprise. From this I draw certain morals as to what conditions a successful naturalism must satisfy. (shrink)

Intuitionism has for many years been a poor relation among the various metaethical theories, commonly thought both parochial and irrational. Most recent writers who attempt a survey of ethical theory mention it briefly in an embarrassed sort of way, and then dismiss it in a paragraph or two. John Rawls, however, does not share this common attitude. In his recent book he represents his own theory as being an alternative both to intuitionism and to utilitarianism, and it is apparent from (...) his discussion that he takes both of these latter theories seriously, as having substantial attraction to reasonable men. Those sympathetic to intuitionism have no doubt been cheered by Rawls’ respectful treatment; but they are likely also to have been dismayed by the fact that, because he focuses upon a somewhat unusual understanding of it, he does not make clear how his theory stands in relation to intuitionism in its most general form, nor whether there are varieties of intuitionism consistent with the whole of his theory or at least with important parts of it. I shall try to answer these questions here. (shrink)

Upshot: Albeit mostly supportive of our work, the commentaries we received highlighted a few points that deserve additional explanation, with regard to the notion of learning in our model, the relationship between our model and the brain, as well as the notion of anticipation. This open discussion emphasizes the need for toy computer models, to fuel theoretical discussion and prevent business-as-usual from getting in the way of new ideas.

Context: Constructivist approaches to cognition have mostly been descriptive, and now face the challenge of specifying the mechanisms that may support the acquisition of knowledge. Departing from cognitivism, however, requires the development of a new functional framework that will support causal, powerful and goal-directed behavior in the context of the interaction between the organism and the environment. Problem: The properties affecting the computational power of this interaction are, however, unclear, and may include partial information from the environment, exploration, distributed processing (...) and aggregation of information, emergence of knowledge and directedness towards relevant information. Method: We posit that one path towards such a framework may be grounded in these properties, supported by dynamical systems. To assess this hypothesis, we describe computational models inspired from swarm intelligence, which we use as a metaphor to explore the practical implications of the properties highlighted. Results: Our results demonstrate that these properties may serve as the basis for complex operations, yielding the elaboration of knowledge and goal-directed behavior. Implications: This work highlights aspects of interaction that we believe ought to be taken into account when characterizing the possible mechanisms underlying cognition. The scope of the models we describe cannot go beyond that of a metaphor, however, and future work, theoretical and experimental, is required for further insight into the functional role of interaction with the environment for the elaboration of complex behavior. Constructivist content: Inspiration for this work stems from the constructivist impetus to account for knowledge acquisition based on interaction. (shrink)

In the recent spate of philosophers' writing on legal ethics, most contend that lawyers' professional role exposes them to great risk of moral wrongdoing; and some even conclude that the role's demands inevitably corrupt lawyers' characters. In assessing their arguments, I take up three questions: (1) whether philosophers' training and experience give them authority to scold lawyers; (2) whether anything substantive has emerged in the scolding that lawyers are morally bound to take to heart; and (3) whether lawyers ought to (...) defer to philosophers' claims about moral principle. I return a negative answer to each. (shrink)